The Epistemology of Performance

How do we know if an interpretation is correct?  We don't.  Then when we say that
 the predictability of a performance is dependent on the knowledge and skill of 
the performer, we cannot be making any qualitative judgement.  This implies that 
the quality of interpretation does not depend on the knowledge and skill of the 
performer!



Theories of Knowledge

Deduction (Mathematical)

Induction (Scientific)

Philosophical

These are the most common concepts of knowledge.  In brief, it has been proposed 
that, in general, people place these concepts in an order of reliability.  Most 
people would place more reliability with either mathematical deduction or 
scientific induction than with philosophical speculation, while most would feel 
that deduction is more reliable than induction, if only because in some respects 
in can be said that mathematics is a pure, abstract area whereas science is 
principally practical - it is concerned with making things work and making 
predictions rather than purely with explanations as to how things work - indeed, 
one of the main defences of inductive thought is that it has proved successful 
in practice and that this, therefore helps to prove its usefulness in theory.  
Again, philosophical problems tend to be, by their very nature, matters of 
speculation and conjecture rather then absolutes and so are inherently unreliable
 from an absolute point of view.  As a number of commentators have pointed out, 
however, there are a number of problems with this.


This whole area is a difficult one and one fraught with differing views and so 
for a more complete picture, readers are encouraged to consult the diverse ideas 
from all these areas.  In brief, however, there would appear to be a tendency 
from all parties working in these areas to propose 'solutions' which are 
favourable to their own area.  So, for instance, there is a tendency for 
mathematicians to suggest that the justification for deduction lies in history, 
tradition, intuition, Plato and even the very structure of nature and therefore 
of our brains, which are physical manifestations of numeric principals:


Nature is number...

Similarly, scientists may take what could be seen as a rather lenient view of 
induction.  The main problem here is the relationship between observation and 
prediction.  So, if we perform a given action and constantly see a given result, 
we may be tempted to predict that this tells us something secure about the given 
situation.  Most scientists would recognise, however, that there is no proof of 
this, merely that we are making assumptions about it, but may defend the practice
 by suggesting that the more observations are made that conform to our 
predictions, the more secure our reasoning is, and that, ultimately, if it works 
then there's no need to fix it.

Philosophers, particularly those who do not deal with either deduction or 
induction would commonly...



It may be that during the last century, when many areas of mathematical, 
scientific and philosophical speculation have become increasingly inter-related, 
most obviously due to the enormous impact of such ideas and innovations as the 
computer and theories of computation, Godel's theorem, the theory of relativity 
and quantum theory and many aspects of modern 'post-classical' physics.  This has
 led an increasing number of people in such areas to become involved in these 
rather broader and more basic ones, such as the theory of knowledge itself.  
Some have done so because it interests them, others because they are in the 
process of developing ideas and theories which cannot but take into account 
these very basic issues.

It has been pointed out that none of the three methods of thought given above, 
it they can all be called methods, are really any more justifiably reliable than 
any other, and it has also been pointed out that the very speculation that 
suggests that one may be more reliable than another, is itself a principally 
philosophical speculation that by its own specification suggests that it is 
highly unreliable.

A solution to this has been proposed by Karl Popper... who points out that one 
of the stumbling blocks of many of these ideas, and certainly the first two, is 
the search for proof, or for certainty.  If we can find no certain proof of 
anything, then arguments or ideas will inevitably appear weak when scrutinised 
from an unsympathetic view-point.  So, if we argue that is must be the case 
that when we drop a heavy object it will fall towards the ground, someone need 
only ask, 'why?', or 'who says?' and 'why should I believe him', or 'I did the 
same thing yesterday and it didn't happen - prove me wrong', and the argument 
becomes impossible - we are trying to prove that one form of personal experience 
is more valid than another.


Performance
How do we judge what is good or bad in performance, or, for that matter, in any 
principally aesthetic matter?  Obviously there are many differences between 
different people, according to their own criteria, but with aesthetic matters, 
why should we accept certain criteria over any others?  Presumably, we would 
normally accept, at least to begin with, that someone who has a record of success
 or at least reasonable judgement about a particular activity should be granted 
a certain amount of credit - we should at least trust them to a point.  But to 
what point?  How far should we trust those whom we are told, or who we feel are 
in authority?

And what about the other way around?  If we are told that we are able to judge 
qualitatively other work - to what extent should we simply accept our own 
criteria? Perhaps we are wrong, at least in our immediate reaction - perhaps we 
are missing something quite significant due to our own preconceptions.